Abstract: This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, publicly pledge to pay a financial reward to every contractor he has invited to bid, as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for short-listed bidders are costly. Nevertheless, it is generally optimal for the procurer to credibly implement the same restriction of the number of bidders that is optimal under full commitment.
Introduction
A common feature of many procurement auctions is that bidding is costly. Contractors must assess the job to be done which often requires extensive explorations and detailed bid proposals. In the presence of such bidding costs, bidder participation and bids depend significantly on the expected number of competitors in such a way that more competition is disadvantageous to the auctioneer as in Lang and Rosenthal (1991) and Tan (1992) . Therefore, the auctioneer would like to convince bidders that he invites only a limited number of bidders.
If the auctioneer is a major non-profit organization or government agency, the auctioneer can commit himself to invite only a limited number of bidders to participate in the auction. 1 However, in many applications, such commitment is not feasible. For example, if a family wants to hire a contractor to renovate their house, they can always invite yet another contractor; they may want contractors to believe that they restrict bidding, but they will benefit from breaching that trust. In that case, bidders consider any announcement concerning the size of the short-list of bidders as "cheap talk" and make their own rational predictions concerning the number of invited bidders before they participate. On this background, the present paper explores the use of rewards as an indirect commitment device. There, the procurer offers to pay a financial reward to every bidder who is invited to bid. Such a reward makes it profitable to the procurer to invite only a limited number of bidders. Bidders then use the information conveyed by that reward to predict how many bidders are actually invited to bid.
There is a small literature on using rewards for bidders when bidding is costly. Gal, Landsberger, and Nemirovski (2007) and Fan and Wolfstetter (2008) explore whether reimbursing bidding costs may profitably change the composition of participating bidders.
2 However, unlike in this literature, the present paper characterizes the rewards necessary to back up an announced size of the short-list and solves the optimal reward and associated size of the short-list. Since rewards are costly, there is a trade-off between cost and size of the short-list. Nevertheless, we find that it is optimal to invite exactly the same number of bidders as under full commitment, provided the number of potential bidders is sufficiently large.
Model
We consider a variation of the well-known "contractor's game" by Lang and Rosenthal (1991) . There, a procurer faces a large number of potential, anonymous contractors n ! 3 and invites a subset of contractors to bid in a first-price (reverse) auction. Performing the job is costly and so is bidding. A bid is an offer to perform the job in exchange for a requested price called bid. Bidders have two kinds of common value costs: the uncertain performance cost, c, and the commonly known bidding cost, e 2 ð0; 1Þ. The performance cost is drawn from the continuous probability distribution F : ½0; 1 À e ! ½0; 1 with twice continuously differentiable p.d.f. f.
The game is as follows: (1) Nature draws the common value performance cost c from the c.d.f. F which is observed by all contractors but not by the auctioneer. The number of potential contractors n is a public information. (2) The procurer announces the size of the short-list m n, invites a n contractors to bid in a first-price (reverse) auction with reserve price R ¼ 1, and promises to pay every invited bidder a financial reward, r. Bidders learn about m but cannot observe a. (3) Bidders predict how many contractors are invited to bid and simultaneously decide whether to bid and if they bid how much to bid. (4) The procurer selects the lowest bidder as winner (provided that bid does not exceed the reserve price R), the winner performs the job, and payments are made.
The announcement of the size of the short-list, m, is purely "cheap talk" and is introduced only to compare the indirect commitment device that uses a reward r with a mechanism that has the power to directly commit to a restricted number of invited bidders. Therefore, without loss of generality, we only consider combinations of m; a, and r for which it is in the best interest of the procurer to invite exactly the announced number of m bidders, so that a ¼ m is an equilibrium strategy of the procurer for given r.
3
For each given combination ðm; r; aÞ with a ¼ m, the bidding subgame is exactly the "contractor's game" by Lang and Rosenthal (1991) . That game has a unique symmetric equilibrium. There, each of the m bidders makes a bid with probability q and, if he bids, draws his bid at random from the c.d.f. of bids B : ½c þ e; 1 ! ½0; 1:
Obviously, the equilibrium ðq; BÞ is independent of the reward for bidding; that reward only matters to credibly back the announced number of invited bidders. An implication of this result is that the probability distribution of the equilibrium price is stochastically increasing in the number of bidders m, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (see Theorem 2, Lang and Rosenthal 1991) . Therefore, if the procurer can commit to restrict the number of bidders, he should short-list exactly m ¼ 2 bidders.
As already observed by Lang and Rosenthal (1991, 334) , the game has also asymmetric equilibria, which are ignored here.
Rewards as (an indirect) commitment device
If the procurer does not offer a reward to invited bidders, he will invite all n bidders, because regardless of bidders' beliefs, inviting one more bidder increases the probability that procurement succeeds and reduces the expected equilibrium price. Therefore, if r ¼ 0, in equilibrium the procurer invites all n bidders and bidders expect the procurer to invite all n bidders, which however minimizes the procurer's payoff.
We now explore whether and how the procurer can use a financial reward to bidders as a commitment device to make it an equilibrium strategy to invite a restricted number of bidders, m < n. For this purpose, we assume that the procurer publicly pledges to pay a reward r to all contractors who he invites to bid (regardless of whether they submit a bid).
An announced short-list of size m together with a reward for bidding, r, is called "credible," if and only if the procurer benefits neither from inviting more bidders (upward deviation) nor from inviting fewer bidders (downward deviation), assuming bidders believe that he invites exactly m bidders.
In order to formalize the notion of a credible mechanism and to construct the smallest reward that implement an announced short-list m < n one needs to compute the payoff the procurer earns if he deviates and invites either more or fewer bidder. For this purpose, suppose the procurer has announced ðm; rÞ, bidders believe that he will invite only m bidders, yet the procurer deviates and invites a n bidders to participate in the auction. Denote the associated (deviation) payoff of the procurer by Åðm; r; aÞ and πðm; rÞ :¼ Åðm; r; mÞ.
Using this notation, upward deviations are prevented if and only if πðm; rÞ ! Åðm; r; aÞ; for all n ! a > m; m < n; ½2
and downward deviations are prevented if and only if πðm; rÞ ! Åðm; r; aÞ; for all 1 a <m; m < n; ½3
At the outset, we mention the obvious fact that Proposition 1 (Default mechanism). The mechanism ðm; rÞ ¼ ðn; 0Þ is credibly implementable, and it is the only credible mechanism if r ¼ 0.
We now show in a sequence of Lemmas how one can credibly implement a short-list of size m < n.
Lemma 1. The deviation payoff of the procurer who announces ðm; rÞ with m < n but deviates and invites a n bidders, while bidders believe that he invites m bidders, is equal to Åðm; r; aÞ ¼ Proof. Suppose the procurer has announced the mechanism ðm; r Ã ðmÞÞ with 2 m < n, and bidders believe that he invites exactly m bidders to participate in the auction. We prove by induction that r Ã ðmÞ is the smallest reward that assures that the procurer does not benefit from inviting more than m bidders.
4 Of course, if m ¼ n, upward deviations are impossible; therefore, r Ã ðnÞ ¼ 0 is trivially true.
Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device
(1) We show that the reward r Ã ðmÞ deters the procurer from inviting one more bidder and it is the smallest reward that achieves this goal, i.e. There, the last step follows from the concavity of Åðm; 0; KÞ in K (see Lemma 2). ■
In the following, we will solve the optimal (credible) mechanism ðm; rÞ. There, we will show that the downward-deviation constraints are not binding, i.e. the optimal mechanism that rules out upward deviations and also rules out downward deviations.
Optimal credible mechanism
In order to solve the optimal mechanism ðm; rÞ that credibly implements the announced short-list of size m, we proceed in three steps:
(1) We show that it is more profitable to credibly implement m ¼ 2 than any other m < n if one ignores the downward-deviation constraints; (2) we show that the mechanism ðm; rÞ ¼ ð2; r Ã ð2ÞÞ also satisfies the downward incentive constraints that were ignored in step (1) 
Kðq; mÞf ðcÞdc:
After a bit of rearranging, one finds
We show that yðqÞ > 0; "q 2 ð0; 1Þ.
We have y 0 ðqÞ ¼ ðm À 1Þq þ ðm À 1 À 2mqÞ logð1 À qÞ;
Evidently, y 0 ð0Þ ¼ 0, and y 00 ðqÞ > 0, "q 2 ð0; 1Þ and therefore, y 0 ðqÞ > 0, "q 2 ð0; 1Þ. Again, because yð0Þ ¼ 0, it follows that yðqÞ > 0, "q 2 ð0; 1Þ.
Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device
Hence, we conclude that πðm; r Ã ðmÞÞ is decreasing in m, "q 2 ð0; 1Þ, and thus ð2; r Ã ð2ÞÞ is the optimal mechanism that satisfies the upward-deviation constraint. ■ Proposition 2. The mechanism ðm; rÞ ¼ ð2; r Ã ð2ÞÞ is optimal in the class of mechanisms that credibly implement m < n.
Proof. satisfied. ■ It may be surprising that implementing a short-list of two is optimal considering that the reward r Ã ðmÞ is the highest at m ¼ 2. However, if one implements m ¼ 2, that high reward is paid only to two bidders and the expected profit (before deducting the rewards) is maximized at m ¼ 2. Even though implementing m ¼ 2 is more profitable than implementing any other m 2 f3; . . . ; n À 1g, it may be even more profitable to use no rewards at all and implement the default mechanism ðm; rÞ ¼ ðn; 0Þ, which is also credible (see Proposition 1). This raises the question: is it optimal to use rewards to commit to a short-list of two bidders?
The default mechanism gives rise to a most unfavorable probability distribution of the equilibrium price, which becomes less favorable in the strong sense of first-order stochastic dominance, as n is increased. Therefore, the benefit of using rewards is strictly increasing in n. This suggests that if n is sufficiently large, the optimal reward mechanism ð2; r Ã ð2ÞÞ is more profitable than the default mechanism. Evidently, ΔðcÞ is strictly decreasing in c and is equal to zero at c ¼ 1 À e. Therefore, the ΔðcÞ is positive for all c 2 ð0; 1 À eÞ, and hence the difference between the expected profits [7] is positive. From this, it follows that ðm; rÞ ¼ ð2; r Ã ðsÞÞ is optimal either for all n or for all n above some threshold level. ■ We close with an example that illustrates how large the number of potential bidders must be to make it optimal to credibly implement a short-list of size two. This example assumes that c is uniformly distributed while the cost of bidding e may assume different values. We find that for each given level of e, there exists a minimal size of the pool of potential bidders, denoted by n Ã , so that πð2; r Ã ð2ÞÞ < ¼ > πðn; 0Þ for all n < ¼ > n Ã . That threshold number, n Ã , is increasing in e.
Therefore, as e is increased, the reduced profitability of the reward scheme must be compensated by a larger minimum number of potential bidders, as summarized in Table 1 .
Discussion
In the present paper, we assumed that potential bidders are anonymous. If the procurer knows the identity of the potential bidders, he may consider to announce a short-list with named bidders. In that case, a bidder who is invited but was not short-listed will know that the procurer deviated from his promise to invite only short-listed bidders to bid. This suggests that, if feasible, announcing a short-list of named bidders is a costless commitment device that can implement the optimal number of invited bidders without the use of rewards. However, a named short-list only gives rise to multiple equilibria among which one works as a commitment device and other does not. The equilibria that 
